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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY: ANALYSIS OF RECENT
EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
In the eighteen month period from July 1984 through De-
cember 1985 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
thirty-three cases' construing the Federal Bankruptcy Code.2
1. The cases dealing with bankruptcy issue decided by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals during this 18 month period are: F & M Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Richards,
780 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1985); Lend Lease v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp.
Co.), 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir.
1985); Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 778 F.2d
1297 (8th Cir. 1985); Stevenson v. Stevenson Assocs., Inc. (In re Stevenson Assocs.,
Inc.), 777 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1985); Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Long
(In re Long), 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985); Vreugdenhil v. Hoekstra, 773 F.2d 213
(8th Cir. 1985); Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Leonard (In re Standard
Conveyor Co.), 773 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1985); N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters
Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985);
Jennen v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Nat'l Store
Fixture Co. (In re Nat'l Store Fixture Co.), 769 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1985); Basin Elec.
Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985); Bankers Trust
Co. BT Serv. Ct. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1985); Clark-
son v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co. (In re Clarkson), 767 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985); Fossum
v. Federal Land Bank (In re Fossum), 764 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Superior
Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1985); Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v.
Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1985); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restau-
rant Equip. Co.), 761 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1985); Martin v. U.S. (In re Martin), 761 F.2d
472 (8th Cir. 1985); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Monnier (In re Monnier Bros.), 755 F.2d
1336 (8th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v. State Bank of Towner (In re Gelking), 754 F.2d
778 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3529 (1985); Dahlquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Dahlquist), 751 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1985), on remand, 53 Bankr. 428 (1985); Mann v.
McCombs (In re McCombs), 751 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Arlon Indus. (In re
Sepco, Inc.), 750 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.
1984); Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 748 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1984); Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. DeLeve, 748 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984); Cassidy Land & Cattle Co.
v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Cassidy Land & Cattle Co.), 747 F.2d
487 (8th Cir. 1984); Button Hook Cattle Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
(In re Button Hook Cattle Co.), 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984); Kotts v. Westphal, 746
F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1984); Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Newcomb), 744
F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); Missouri
ex rel. Ashcroft v. Cannon (In re Cannon), 741 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1984); Brookfield
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1984); Citizens State Bank v.
Davison (In re Davison), 738 F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1984); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Huhm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598. 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 10 1- 151326 (1982)); Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
1
Krikava: Recent Developments in the Law of Bankruptcy: Analysis of Recent
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
IWILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
This survey will discuss significant developments concerning
fraudulent conveyances; the allocation of payment between
nondischargeable and dischargeable debts; nondischarge-
ability of debts for malicious conversion; avoidance of liens
created upon marriage dissolution; adequate protection; and
other significant developments. The purpose of this survey is
to analyze recent bankruptcy trends in the Eighth Circuit and
their importance to the practitioner.
I. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES: THE CONTINUING DEBATE ON
FORECLOSURE AS A TRANSFER OF INTEREST WITHIN
SECTION 548
A. Fraudulent Conveyance
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a
remarkable decision3 that changed the doctrine of fraudulent
conveyance under the Bankruptcy Code.4 Prior to that deci-
sion, no court had addressed the issue of whether a regularly
conducted foreclosure sale could be set aside as a fraudulent
conveyance.
5
eraljudgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333-92 (codified at scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) (Supp. 11 1984).
3. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). The Dur-
rett decision was remarkable in that it represented a distinct departure from clearly
established assumptions about secured transactions. Prior to the development of the
fraudulent conveyance doctrine, it had generally been perceived that "a transfer of
property ha(d) taken place at the time a secured creditor perfect(ed) its interest in a
debtor's assets." E. Berman & J. Fierberg, Durrett: The Problem and Suggestions for its
Solution, 90 COM. LJ. 162 (April 1985). The Dur-ett case was the first to reject that
notion. Id. at 162.
4. The Durrett case held that a regularly conducted foreclosure sale constituted
a transfer within the meaning of the existing bankruptcy law. Id. at 204; see Chandler
Act, Pub. L. No. 575, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976) (repealed 1978). The old bank-
ruptcy act defined a transfer as "1the sale and every other and different mode, direct
or indirect, of disposing of. . . property....." 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976) (repealed
1978). The court in Durrett found that receipt of approximately 70% of the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the foreclosure sale was insufficient. Durrel, 621 F.2d at
204. See generally W. Henning, .An ..lnalvis of Dunett and its Impact on Real and Pesonal
Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C.L. REV. 257 (1985) (discussing
usefulness of Durrett fraudulent transfer theorv).
5. See Henning, supra note 4, at 258. Throughout the development of the doc-
trine of fraudulent conveyances, however, few people anticipated the creation of the
doctrine represented in Dur'et. Id. at 257. See also Abramson v. Lakewood Bank and
Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J. dissenting), reh. denied. 655
F.2d 1131, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). .Judge Clark stated that "[it is interest-
ing to me that Durrett is the first case treating this problem-after 90 years of bank-
ruptcy law and mortgage of a time greater than the memory of man. It again
[Vol. 12
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Since Durrett, this area has been actively litigated.6 Three ba-
sic theories have emerged that interpret this developing doc-
trine.7 The Eighth Circuit court recently entered the fray for
the first time with its decision of In re Hulm.8 In Hulm, the
court held that a regularly conducted, noncollusive, judicial
foreclosure sale constitutes a transfer within the meaning of
section 548. 9 Further, the court held that there is no presump-
establishes what an imaginative lawyer can do when he adds persuasion." Id. For
further discussion of the effects of Durrett, see Berman & Fierberg, supra note 3, at
162; L. Coppel & L. Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of "Transfer 100
BANKING L.J. 676 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197 (9th
Cir.) (noncollusive, nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not fraudulent transfer), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Abramson, 647 F.2d 547 (remand to determine if transfer fraud-
ulent); Durrett, 621 F.2d 201; see also Rueback v. Attleboro Savings Bank (In re
Rueback) 55 Bankr 163 (Bankr. Mass. 1985); In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695 (Bankr.
N.Y. 1985); Hoffman v. Heritage Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 Bankr.
837 (D. Colo. 1985); White v. Luton (In re White), 47 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. Tex. 1985);
Gillman v. Preston Family Invest. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. Utah
1982).
7. The first theory, which is represented by the Durrett case states, in essence,
that a foreclosure sale is a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and
that the price paid at the foreclosure sale is prone to attack on the ground of insuffi-
cient consideration. See Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203-04; see also (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d at
326-27; Abrarnson, 647 F.2d at 549.
The second theory holds that no transfer occurs at the foreclosure sale. The
transfer occurs at the time the security interest in the property is perfected (i.e. re-
corded) under state law and that the foreclosure sale is merely an event of change of
possession rather than a transfer of ownership. See Vadrid, 725 F.2d at 1200-01; see
also Abramson, 647 F.2d at 549 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("mortgagor-trustor/bankrupt
does nothing but default - that cannot be translated into 'transfer' ").
The third theory recognizes that a transfer occurs at the foreclosure sale, but
holds that the price paid at the sale is presumptively adequate absent defects in* the
sale. Cf Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1984), afd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197.
8. 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398.
9. Id. at 327. Section 548 states, in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on
or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to . . .defraud any entity of which the debtor was . . . indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer
or obligation;
(d)(l) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such
transfer becomes so far perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor against whom, such transfer to be perfected cannot aquire an
1986]
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tion of adequate consideration for the transfer.10 Subsequent
to Hulm, the Bankruptcy Code was amended, in effect affirming
the Eighth Circuit's view on the issue of transfer." This sec-
tion addresses the history of the doctrine of fraudulent convey-
ance, the Hulm case in light of that history, the impact of the
1984 amendments on the issue, and an alternative solution in
light of economic realities and business expectations.
B. The Hulm Decision
The common law concept of fraudulent transfer required
that, in order to avoid the transfer, the debtor must have a spe-
cific intent to defraud the creditor.' 2 Eventually, the concept
of fraudulent conveyance developed to where actual intent be-
came irrelevant.' 3 The conveyance could be avoided if it had
the effect of defrauding creditors.' 4
interest in the property transferred that is superior to the interest in
such property of the transferee ....
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see also II U.S.C. § 101(48) (Supp. I 1984)
(provision amends former section 101 (4 1)).
10. 738 F.2d at 327. "We disagree with the approach taken by the bankruptcy
court." Id. "We do not believe that the sale price at a regularly conducted foreclo-
sure sale, although absent fraud or collusion, can automatically be deemed to pro-
vide a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the interest of the debtor
transferred within the meaning of section 548(a)." Id.
11. Section 101 defining transfer was renumbered in the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 391, 401, 421, 98
Stat. 333, 364, 366, 368 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (48) (Supp. 11 1984)). Section
548 was amended by the addition of the words "whether voluntarily or involuntarily"
at the end of clause (a). Id. § 463, 98 Stat. 333, 378; see also supra note 7.
12. See Henning, supra note 4, at 259-60. In his article, Professor Henning thor-
oughly discusses the history of the fraudulent conveyance doctrine from the sixteenth
century to the present. Id.; see also S. Alden, S. Gross & P. Borowitz, Real Property
Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus.
LAw. 1605, 1605 (1983) (purpose of fraudulent conveyance law was to prevent delib-
erate action which hinders, delays or defrauds creditor); Note, RegularlV Conducted
Non-collusive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales: Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankrupt.
Code, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 264-65 (1983) (at common law, transfers voided if
intentionally fraudulent).
13. Henning, supra note 4, at 260. As Professor Henning points out, it was diffi-
cult to prove subjective fraud. To remedy this problem, courts developed the con-
cept of outward manifestations of fraud or "badges of fraud." See id. By the
twentieth century, the law was "in a confused, disorganized state." Id. In 1918, the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was approved in an attempt to alleviate the
confusion.
14. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918). The
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) was first formulated in 1918. Id. It
adopted the basic premises of the English concept, but removed the requirement of
intent to defraud. Id. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act has been succeeded
[Vol. 12
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The concept of fraudulent conveyances was addressed in
modern bankruptcy law in section 67(d)(2) of the Chandler
Act, the predecessor of the Bankruptcy Code. 15 The concept
of a fraudulent conveyance, which originally included only vol-
untary transfers made by the debtor, was broadened to include
involuntary transfers.' 6 In 1978, the Bankruptcy Reform Act
replaced section 67 with section 548.17 The Bankruptcy Code
defined transfer under section 101 (41) to mean any transfer of
interest. 18
The various courts that have addressed this issue have dis-
agreed on the appropriate outcome of this type of case,' 9 the
theory to support the outcome,20 and the policy issues in-
volved. 2' The majority of courts that have addressed this issue
have concluded that a transfer, within the meaning of section
by the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A
U.L.A. 639 (1984). The later act retains the same basic structure as the 1918 Act. See
Id. at 640.
15. Chandler Act, ch. 575 § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976) (repealed 1978)).
16. Id. Prior to the Chandler Act, the definition of a transfer under bankruptcy
law did not include involuntary transfers. See Bankruptcy Act ofJuly 1, 1898, ch. 541
§ 1(25), 30 Stat. 544, 545 (amended 1938). The Chandler Act added involuntary
transfer to the definition of transfer under the Act. See 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976) (re-
pealed 1978).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982). Avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance re-
quires essentially a four-pronged analysis. First, it must be determined that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i). Second, it must
be established that the disputed transfer occurred within one year of the filing of bank-
ruptcy. Id. § 548(a). Third, there must be a transfer within the meaning of the Act.
Id. Finally, the consideration received by the debtor must have been "less than a
reasonably equivalent value." Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982) (recodified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (Supp. II
1984)).
19. One year after Durrett, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that prece-
dent in Abranison. In Abramson, however, Judge Clark wrote a strong dissent which
acknowledged that the case was correctly decided under Durrett, but argued that Dur-
rett was incorrectly decided. Abramson, 647 F.2d at 549 (ClarkJ., dissenting) ("Durrett
is simply wrong in its holding that a foreclosure sale is a transfer within the meaning
of § 67(d)"); see also Alsop, 14 Bankr. at 986-87 (explicitly rejects Durrett and holds that
no transfer occurs at foreclosure).
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. See Hulm, 738 F.2d at 327 ("policy considerations cannot affect the outcome
of his case, but must be addressed, if at all, by Congress"). This language is ironic in
that the Congress had addressed the problem in the 1984 reform provisions. See infra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text. It seems odd that the court did not refer to the
legislative action in this regard. But see Simpson, supra note 32, at 82 (Simpson argues
that no transfer occurs at foreclosure and that a contrary holding threatens the un-
derpinnings of secured lending).
19861
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548, occurs at the foreclosure sale. 22 A few cases have held to
the contrary that the transfer, in fact, occurs at the time that
the underlying mortgage is perfected and that the foreclosure
of the mortgage is just the mere consummation of the underly-
ing transfer. 23 A third approach has begun to emerge. This
approach acknowledges that a transfer occurs at the foreclo-
sure sale, but holds that the price paid for the property should
be deemed presumptively adequate.
24
Finally, Congress stepped in and amended the pertinent
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in an apparent effort to
clear up the conflict.25 Presumably, the 1984 amendments
mandate that a transfer occurs at foreclosure. 26 It would ap-
22. Hulm, 738 F.2d at 325; Abramson, 647 F.2d at 549; Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204;
Hoffman v. Heritage Savings and Loan Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 Bankr. 837, 839 (D.
Colo. 1985); Christian v. Ryan (In re Christian), 48 Bankr. 833, 835 (D. Colo. 1985);
Jacobson v. First State Bank of Benson (In reJacobson), 48 Bankr. 497, 499 (Bankr.
Minn. 1985); White v. Luton (In re White), 47 Bankr. at 101 (Bankr. Tex. 1985); Case
Credit Corp. v. Kangas (In re Kangas), 46 Bankr. 102 (Bankr. Minn. 1985); First Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1983); Richardson v. Preston Family Invest. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. at 446-
47 (Bankr. Utah 1982); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. The Equitable
Trust Co. (In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36 (S.D. Fla.
1982).
23. See, e.g., Alsop, 14 Bankr. at 986-87; see also Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199 (foreclo-
sure sale is not a transfer under § 548(a)).
24. See Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424; Reinboldt v. The Travelers Ins. Co. (In re
Reinboldt), 39 Bankr. 678 (D. Minn. 1984) (this holding was implicitly overruled by
Hulm, 738 F.2d at 327); see also In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. N.Y. 1985) ("The
highest bid received in a properly conducted foreclosure action, where there has
been no complaint of foul play or improper process, is the reasonably equivalent
value of the property").
Much has been made in the scholarly writing of the distinction between judicial
foreclosures and foreclosures created by "power of sale" clauses in contracts. Some
have argued that only those foreclosures that are presided over by a court should be
included in the rule that would presume the adequacy of the price paid. See in/ra note
55.
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (Supp. II 1984). Section 101(48) amends section
101 (41) to read that a transfer includes "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with
an interst in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption." Id.
The 1984 amendment pertinent to fraudulent conveyance explicitly adds that an
involuntary transfer may be a fraudulent conveyance. II U.S.C. § 548(a); see in/ra
note 26.
26. See Berman & Fierberg, supra note 3, at 166. ("Itihe Amendments found in
Section 101 (48) of the Bankruptcy Amendments . . . ostensibly codified the Durrett
line of cases on the issue of transfer .... "). But see 130 CONG. REC. § 13771,
§ 13771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statements by Senators Dole and DeConcini)
(disclaiming notion that the amendment codified Dunrrett). The comments of the Sell-
[Vol. 12
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pear that Congress had accepted the Durrett position as correct
concerning the transfer issue.27 Subsequent "clarifications" to
the 1984 amendments and recent scholarly debate, however,
has cast doubt on whether the amendments do, in fact, dictate
that a transfer occurs at the foreclosure sale.
28
It was in light of the foregoing that the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided Hulm. 29 The case arose before the 1984
amendments took effect and was therefore not governed by the
most recent amendments to the provisions.
3 0
In Hulm, the debtor granted a mortgage on a home he had
purchased. 31 The debtor fell behind on his payments and
eventually the mortgage was foreclosed.3 2 The mortgagee in-
stituted proceedings under state law which culminated in a ju-
dicial foreclosure sale.3 3  The mortgagee purchased the
property at the sale for about 70 percent of the appraised
value.34 After the statutory period of redemption expired, a
sheriff's deed was issued to the mortgagee. 35 The debtor filed
bankruptcy seventeen days later.
3 6
ators, however, have a minimizing effect on the clarification of the issue. See Berman
& Fierberg, supra note 10, at 166. The authors of that article conclude that the 1984
amendments do not, in fact, solve the transfer problem. Id.
27. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(48), 548 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
28. See supra note 26. The text of the Dole, DeConcini exchange reads:
Mr. DiConcini. "My understanding is that these provisions were not in-
tended to have an effect one way or the other on the so-called Durrett issue."
Mr. Dole. "[N]o provision of the bankruptcy bill . . . was intended to inti-
mate any view one way or the other regarding the correctness of the posi-
tion taken in . . . the Durrett case. . . . Thus, the Amendment should not
be construed to in any way codify Durrett or therein cast a cloud over non-
collusive foreclosure sales."
130 CONG. REC. § 13771, § 13771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1985) (statements by Senators
DeConcini and Dole).
29. 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984).
30. The amendment to section 548 became effective for any case filed after July
10, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 552, formerly, § 553 (codified as note after 11
U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 11 1984)).
31. Hum, 738 F.2d at 323.
32. Id. at 325.
33. Id.
34. Id. The price paid at the foreclosure sale represented an amount equal to the
unpaid balance, accrued interest and statutory costs. Id. The property was eventu-
ally sold by First National in "as is" condition for approximately 30% more than it
payed. Brief for Appellant/Cross-Appellee, In re Huim, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984).
35. Huln, 738 F.2d at 325.
36. Id. at 325. The deed was issued on July 9, 1982. First Federal, however, was
unable to take possession until January 7, 1983, because of the automatic stay insti-
tuted at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy. Id.
1986]
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The bankruptcy trustee argued that the foreclosure should
be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. 37 The bankruptcy
court did not reach the issue of transfer, but merely held that
absent fraud or collusion, the sale price at a regularly con-
ductedjudicial foreclosure sale should be deemed a reasonably
equivalent value for the property. 38 In other words, the price
paid at the judicial sale was presumed large enough to not de-
37. Huim, 738 F.2d at 325. The trustee also argued that the transaction should
be set aside as a preferential transfer under section 547. Section 547 provides in
pertinent part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property of the debtor
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the ex-
tent provided by the provisions of this title.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). For a complete discussion of the issue of
preferential transfers, see generally L. KING, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 547.01-.55
(15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER ON BANKRUI-rCY].
The Eighth Circuit court briefly addressed the preference section in two cases
during the survey period. First, in Brown v. First Nat'l Bank of Little Rock, Ark., 748
F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1984), the court held that funds paid to the creditor for the pur-
pose of satisfying the debtor corporation's promissory note could not be recovered
as a preferential transfer since the note was paid out of the personal funds of the
comakers of the note, and the comakers did not receive any property from the debtor
in return for the payment. Id. at 491. The court noted that one of the elements of a
preferential transfer is that the transferred property must be property of the bank-
rupt's estate and that the burden of proof is on the trustee to prove each element of
preferential transfer. Id.
Secondly, in Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Newcomb), 744 F.2d 621
(8th Cir. 1984), the court held that money placed in escrow more than 90 days prior
to filing bankruptcy could not be avoided as a preferential transfer because the trans-
fer of funds was deemed "perfected" as of the time it was placed in escrow, notwith-
standing the fact that the transfer was contingent. Id. at 627; accord Cate v. Nicely (In
re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 656 F.2d 230, 231 (6th Cir. 1981) (payment from escrow
account not avoidable as a preferential transfer because transfer occurred at time
escrow created).
38. Hulm, 738 F.2d at 325. The bankruptcy court rejected both claims and the
trustee did not appeal the preferential transfer portion of the decision. Id.
[Vol. 12
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fraud the estate of funds. Since no fraud was shown, the bank-
ruptcy court refused to set aside the sale as a fraudulent
conveyance. 3
9
The district court held that a transfer occurs at the foreclo-
sure sale and that there was no presumption of adequate con-
sideration.40 The court concluded that the price paid in this
case was, in fact, reasonably equivalent. 4' On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit held that the foreclosure of a mortgage effected
a transfer of interest within the meaning of section 548.42 Sec-
ondly, the court explicitly rejected the bankruptcy court's rul-
ing that, absent fraud or collusion, the sale price obtained at a
judicial foreclosure sale is a reasonably equivalent value of the
property as a matter of law. 43 Since the district court held the
price in this case to be equivalent without the aid of any sort of
evidence, the Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and re-
manded the case to the bankruptcy court for a determination
of the reasonableness of the value given.
44
The issue of whether the court was correct in deciding that a
foreclosure is a transfer under the Act that can be avoided
under section 548 has been extensively debated elsewhere,
45
but it is probably moot because of the 1984 amendments to the
Code.46 The Hulm court was unconcerned about the policy
problems associated with its decision. 47 It seems as though the
courts will, for better or worse, consider foreclosure a transfer
39. Id. The bankruptcy court did not specifically reach the issue of whether a
transfer occurs at the foreclosure sale. The court merely said that whatever transfer
there might have been was irrelevant because the price paid was adequate as a matter
of law. Id.
40. Id. at 324.
41. Id. at 326. The district court held that the price paid in this case was reason-
ably equivalent. The court, however, conducted no evidentiary hearing in that re-
gard. See id.
42. Id. at 327. The court noted that even after the mortgage had been perfected,
the debtor retained an interest in the property at least until the end of the statutory
redemption period. Id. at 326. The court said that under North Dakota law, the
debtor's interest in the property was not terminated until the issuance of the sheriff's
deed. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-09 (1978).
43. Huiln, 738 F.2d at 327. The bankruptcy court relied on hi re Madrid, 21
Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), in formulating its rule.
44. Huln, 738 F.2d at 327. The court directed the bankruptcy court to determine
whether the amount paid was a reasonably equivalent value for the property. Id.
45. See Comment, Mortgage Foreclosure as Fraudulent Conveyance: IsJudicial Foreclosure
An Answer to the Durrett Problem, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 195, 228-34 (1984).
46. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
47. Hulm, 738 F.2d at 327; see also supra note 21.
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within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 48 This is particu-
larly true in light of the 1984 amendments. 49
A simple and logical solution to this problem is for the bank-
ruptcy court to deem the sale price received at a regularly con-
ducted judicial foreclosure sale adequate as a matter of law, 50
thereby removing the uncertainty created by subjecting these
transactions to avoidance under section 548. This solution
would equitably balance the competing policy considerations
involved, and would be less disruptive to real estate
transactions.51
The basic policies of the Bankruptcy Code are to rehabilitate
the bankrupt, 52 and to promote equality among creditors of
the estate by assuring orderly distribution of the estate to
those creditors. 5 3 Section 548 helps foster these policies by as-
suring that the creditors will receive a fair chance to receive as
much payment as possible. The theory extends to judicial
foreclosure sales which occur within one year of bankruptcy, so
the advocates contend, because the creditors need to be pro-
tected from underpayment at the judicial sale. 54
Judicial foreclosure 5 5 sales are conducted in accordance with
48. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
49. But see supra note 28 (statements by DiConcini and Dole).
50. See Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 426; Comment, supra note 45, at 233-34; see also Ab-
ramson, 647 F.2d at 549-50 (Clark, J., dissenting). But see Hulm, 738 F.2d at 327.
51. See Comment, supra note 45, at 205-08.
52. See id. at 214 & n.117.
53. See H.R. REP. No. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 197 U.S. CODE
CONG. AD. NEWS 5963, 6138. See also Note, The New Bankruptcy Act: A Revision of Section
67d-The Death of a Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L.R. 537, 537 (1979).
54. See Hulm, 738 F.2d 323. But see Comment, supra note 45, at 214 (author ar-
gues that the protections inherent injudicial foreclosure should be enough to protect
creditors).
55. Judicial foreclosure is by far the most widely used foreclosure procedure
used in the United States. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW § 7.11, at 466 (1979). The other basic type of foreclosure mechanism
available in the United States is a nonjudicial or "power of sale" clause in the loan
agreement. Id. § 7.9, at 442. For an excellent discussion of the types of foreclosure
proceedings, their differences, and how those differences relate to the doctrine of
fraudulent conveyence, see Comment, supra note 45, at 228-35.
Some have argued that only those foreclosures that are presided over by the
court should be afforded the presumption of reasonably equivalent value. Id. at 203-
08. But see Berman & Fierberg, supra note 10 at 166. "It appears that there does not
exist at least within the reported cases, any distinction between the two forms of
foreclosure sale." Id.; contra Simpson, Real Property Foreclosures: The Fallacy of Durrett,
18 Real Prop. Prob & Tr. J. 73 (1983). Simpson argues that since the foreclosure
does not constitute a transfer that in no event should it be disallowed in bankruptcy.
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certain procedures and safeguards. 56 The purposes of foreclo-
sures are basically to protect the secured creditor who has the
primary interest in the subject property. Another purpose in-
volved is to promote certainty in the financial dealings of the
parties. 57 In judicial foreclosure, a court has continuing juris-
diction over the proceeding in order to ensure fairness. 58 The
court's power includes the discretion to either approve or dis-
approve the sale.59 If the price paid is so inadequate as to be
unfair, the court may, in its discretion, disallow it.6°
In cases like Hulm, where the foreclosure sale is presided
over by a court of general jurisdiction, the price paid for the
property should not be open to attack by the bankruptcy
trustee.6 1 Considerations of policy and economics should be
taken into account. An effort should be made to harmonize
the law of bankruptcy with foreclosure law and the relevant
policies of each should be given effect.62 The bankruptcy court
and a court presiding over a foreclosure sale should not be
56. See generally R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 41.09 (a)-(q)(2), at 611-23 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing general aspects ofjudicial
foreclosure).
57. See Note, supra note 12, at 278 (discusses the uncertainty created by Durrett).
58. See Comment, supra note 45, at 203-08,
59. Id. The court may withhold confirmation of a foreclosure sale if it can be
established that fraud or mistake was involved in the sale. See Washburn, The Judicial
and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
843, 862-63 (1980). Similarly, confirmation may be denied if the price is shocking to
the conscience of the court. Id. at 862. Thus, a court has authority to deny confirma-
tion to unconscionable sales.
60. See Comment, supra note 45, at 209.
61. Much has been made of the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial fore-
closure proceedings as they relate to avoidance. See Comment, supra note 45. The
writer of the Comment argues that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale should not be pre-
sumed to provide adequate compensation because of the lack ofjudicial supervision.
Id. at 232-33.
62. See Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424; see also Simpson, supra note 55, at 77-78.
[A] well-established, and obviously forgotten, principle of bankruptcy law-
namely, the avoidance provisions of bankruptcy law have never been in-
tended to invalidate, and have never even pertained to. the pre-petition enforce-
ment of a lien valid under nonbankruptcy law and otherwise unavoidable in
bankruptcy. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
Coppel & Kann, supra note 5, at 677.
[T]he Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" broadlv to include "everv mode.
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntarv or involuntary, of dis-
posing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest .... Under this formulation a fore-
closure sale clearly constitutes a transfer because it effects a transfer of pos-
session . . . . (footnotes omitted)(emiphasis in original).
Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 12, at 1608.
1986]
11
Krikava: Recent Developments in the Law of Bankruptcy: Analysis of Recent
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLL4I MITCHELL LA W REIVIE '
fundamentally at odds. Permitting bankruptcy courts to disaf-
firm foreclosure sales thwarts the policy of protecting the fore-
closing creditor and also decreases certainty in transactions.
63
By allowing the bankruptcy court to overturn foreclosure sales
casts a cloud on the title of property purchased at foreclosure
for a year following the sale.64 The inevitable effect of this will
be to further depress the prices received at foreclosure sales.
65
Ultimately, this will cast a cloud over all secured transactions
because creditors will be uncertain about their ability to collect
on a delinquent mortgage.66
63. See Comment, supra note 45, at 232 (extending Durrett would cause the pri-
mary advantage of judicial foreclosure-stability and marketability of title-to be
lost). Id.
64. In effect, the title can be clouded for well over the one year provided in sec-
tion 548. The transfer has been held to occur on the date of the sale and not at the
expiration of the redemption period. See, e.g., In re Kangas, 46 Bankr. 102. There-
fore, the redemption and fraudulent conveyance time periods run concurrently.
This, however, ignores the fact that the complaint filed by the trustee to set aside the
sale may be filed up to two years after the trustee is appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)
(1982). Furthermore, the trustee will not be elected until sometime after the petition
is filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Therefore, the period of risk to
purchasers can be much longer than one year. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 278
n.120.
For example, in a state like North Dakota where the redemption period is one
year (six months under subsection one of § 32-19.1-04), the additional risk to credi-
tors is clear. Under the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of section 548, the purchased
property is at risk for a longer period than it would have been just under the redemp-
tion statute. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-24-02 (Supp. 1985).
In a state where the statutory redemption period is one year, the argument could
be made that the risk to the buyer is not increased because the time periods of risk
coincide. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 580.23, subd. 2 (1984) (one year redemption on
mortgages executed beforeJuly 1, 1967; mortgages where less than two-thirds of the
principle amount is owed; and for parcels of land over 10 acres). This argument,
however, ignores the nature of statutory redemption. Redemption is a known and
quantifiable risk taken into account by purchasers at foreclosure. In the event the
debtor is able to raise the necessary finds the property reverts automatically. Section
548, on the other hand, affords no simple procedures to determine the appropriate-
ness of the price paid, and therefore, recovery of the property is uncertain.
Forcing the purchaser to be at risk under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
essentially forces the creditor to risk buying a lawsuit in an effort to maintain owner-
ship of the property. Should the trustee determine that the price paid at foreclosure
is inadequate within the meaning of section 548, the purchaser will be forced into
court to attempt to protect the investment. This situation, while not necessarily in-
creasing the time period of risk, definitely increases the number of risks the pur-
chaser is subject to and decreases the certainty of the transactions.
65. See Simpson, supra note 55, at 75.
66. See Madrid, 757 F.2d at 1202 (discusses negative repercussions of allowing a
"de facto right of redemption" under the Code); see also Note, supra note 12, at 278-
79. At present, a mortgagee who completes a foreclosure sale cannot be certain
whether it accomplished its objective by recovering its investment or whetler, at
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If the price received at a judicial foreclosure sale were pre-
sumed adequate as a matter of law, this problem could be
avoided.67 This rule would provide an adequate balance be-
tween the interests of the bankruptcy court in promoting
equality and the interests of secured creditors who want to rely
on the title of property obtained at foreclosure sale.
In addition to effectively balancing interests, this rule is also
grounded in sound logic. Since the foreclosure sale is pre-
sided over by a judge, who has the power to disallow the sale if
the price is truly inadequate, it is logical to assume that, as a
matter of law, the sale price was adequate. 68 Similarly, by not
presuming adequacy of consideration, prices obtained at fore-
closure are further depressed.69 With further depressed
prices, the problems associated with avoiding a sale on the
grounds that the conveyance was fraudulent would be aggra-
vated. Such findings would further increase the likelihood of
sales being disallowed, which would further depress prices.
70
The bankruptcy court's interest in preserving the estate value
would also be served under this rule as it would promote
higher prices at foreclosure sales. Higher prices would in-
crease the value of the estate, which, in turn, would decrease
the likelihood of inadequacy of the purchase price. A further
policy supporting this rule is that it would also advance the
secured creditors' preferred position under the Bankruptcy
Code by fulfilling the creditor's justified reliance on the pledge
property when making loans. 7'
In conclusion, it would seem that the Eighth Circuit in Hulm
was correct in holding that a transfer of the debtor's interest
occurs at the foreclosure sale. 72 The Eighth Circuit, however,
rejected the argument that the price paid at the sale is pre-
sumed to be adequate. The decision, although consistent with
a majority of jurisdictions, is unfortunate. It promotes uncer-
tainty of title and promotes conflict between the bankruptcy
some future time, a bankruptcy court will avoid the sale. Comment, supra note 45, at
235.
67. Comment, supra note 45, at 235.
68. See Berman & Fierberg, supra note 3. at 167; see also Comment, supra note 45.
at 219 (discusses circumstances in which judge can disallow sale).
69. Id.; see also Simpson, supra note 55. at 80-81.
70. See Simpson, supra note 32, at 80.
71. See Comment, supra note 45, at 233.
72. But see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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courts and state courts in determining the adequacy of price at
foreclosure sales. 73
II. DISCHARGEABILITY
The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Bankruptcy Code's
provisions concerning discharge of debts74 in two recent cases.
In the cases of In re Hunter,75 and In re Long,76 the court reaf-
firmed the policy that exceptions to discharge should be nar-
rowly construed. 77 In Hunter, the court held that, where an
underlying debt has both dischargeable and nondischargeable
components, foreclosure proceeds should be apportioned be-
tween the dischargeable and nondischargeable components.
78
In Long, the court held that where a certain sum of money had
been wrongfully converted for the debtor's use, the debt was
still dischargeable because the debtor lacked subjective intent
to defraud.
79
A. Background of Section 523
One of the general purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to
give the debtor a "fresh start" by excusing legal obligations. 80
Certain exceptions, however, have been recognized and codi-
fied under bankruptcy law.8' The current Bankruptcy Code
exempts from discharge ten different classes of obligations. 82
Section 523 of the Code also provides a mechanism for a credi-
73. See Comment, supra note 45, at 233-34.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
75. 771 F.2d at 1130.
76. 774 F.2d at 879.
77. Because of the strong public policy in favor of allowing the debtor a fresh
start through the use of bankruptcy proceedings, the courts have traditionally held
that all debts should be discharged unless they fall within certain narrowly defined
categories. See, e.g., Hunte, 771 F.2d at 1128; see also infra notes 103-04 and accompa-
nying text.
78. 771 F.2d at 1130. See infra text accompanying notes 91-100.
79. 774 F.2d at 881-82. See infra text accompanying notes 103-134.
80. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); accord Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 523. Several kinds of debts are exempted from discharge tinder
the statute. The doctrine of dischargeability has developed through a series of evolu-
tionary steps. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUVrICY, supra note 37, 1 523.01. The kinds of
debts exempt from discharge have increased throughout the history of bankruptcy
law in the United States. See id.
82. These classes of debts arc those that are deemed inappropriate to discharge
for public policy reasons. Debts that arc not dischargeable include:
(1)... a tax or a customs duty-
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(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or
507(a)(6) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or
allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed; or
(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due,
under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years
before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax;
11 U.S.C. § 5 2 3(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See, e.g., Bruning v. United States, 376
U.S. 358 (1964).
Section 523(a)(2) specifically provides:
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinanc-
ing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than
a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent
to deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer
debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for
"luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or
within forty days before the order for relief under this title, or cash ad-
vances aggregating more than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer
credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor
on or within twenty days before the order for relief under this title, are
presumed to be nondischargeable; "luxury good or services" do not
include goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or main-
tenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of
consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be defined for pur-
poses of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). See Hunter, 771 F.2d 1126; see also
Tappan Co. v. Klusman (In re Klusman), 29 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)
(fraud exception must be strictly construed in favor of the debtor).
Section 523(a)(3) specifically provides:
(3) [debts] neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title,
with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, in time to permit-
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6)
of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor
had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing;
or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4). or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a
determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such
paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
case in the time for such timely filing and request;
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1982).
Section 523(a)(4)-(5) provides:
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(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record or
property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation
of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been as-
signed to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision
of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance,
or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support;
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)-(5) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See generally Hoffman & Murray,
Obligations that Cannot be Erased, 5 FAM. ADVOC. No. 3, 18 (1983); Note, Discharge of
Post-Marital Support Obligations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
177 (1981).
Section 523(a)(6) requires: "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to an-
other entity or to the property of another entity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982). Un-
like its predecessor, (I 1 U.S.C. § 35(a)(6) (1976) (repealed 1978)) this provision does
not expressly include willful and malicious conversion of property. The courts, how-
ever, have held that the provision still applies to situations where the debtor has
misappropriated property for his own use. See First Nat'l Bank of Red Bud v. Kimzey
(In re Kimzey), 761 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1985); Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pom-
merer (In re Pommerer), 10 Bankr. 935, 940 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981). See also Long,
774 F.2d at 882; Webster City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Simpson (In re Simpson), 29
Bankr. 202, 208 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); Everwed Co. v. Ayers (In re Ayers), 25
Bankr. 762, 775-76 (Bankr. Tenn. 1982); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Simmons
(In re Simmons), 9 Bankr. 62, 66 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Grand Piano & Furniture
Co. v. Hodges (In re Hodges), 4 Bankr. 513, 514-15 (Bankr. Va. 1980).
Section 523(a)(7)-(8) provides:
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for ac-
tual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty-
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this
subsection; or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred
before three years before the date of the filing of the petition;
(8) for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmen-
tal unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a govern-
mental unit or a nonprofit institution, unless-
(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of any ap-
plicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the fil-
ing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will im-
pose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents;
II U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)-(8) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See generally Ayres & Sagner, The
Bankruptcy Reform Act and Student Loans: Unravelling .Vew Knots, 9 J. COLLEGE & U.L.
REV. 361 (1983); Kalevitch, Educational Loans in Bankruptcy., 2 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 325
(1982); Ahart, Discharging Student Loans in Bankrptcry. 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (1978).
Section 523(a)(9) provides:
(9) that was or could have been listed or scheduled bv the debtor in a prior
case concerning the debtor under this title ..... i I U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
[10](9) to any entity, to the extent that such debt arises fr-om a judgment
or consent decree entered in a court of record against the debtor wherein
liability was incurred by such debtor as a result of ile debtor's operation of
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tor to challenge the dischargeability of debts.83 The provisions
of section 523, however, apply only to individual debtors and
do not apply to commercial debtors.
8 4
These exceptions represent situations where the legislature
has determined that dischargeability of the debts would be
contrary to public policy.8 5 The cases have uniformly held,
however, that the policy of allowing the debtor a fresh start is
overriding, and that exceptions to dischargeability are to be
strictly construed in order to facilitate that policy. 86 The over-
a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of
any jurisdiction within the United States or its territories wherein such mo-
tor vehicle was operated and within which such liability was incurred; or
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (Supp. 11 1984).
When Congress added the new section 9 concerning the nondischargeability of debts
arising from drunken driving, it neglected to renumber the old section 9 as section
10. Presumably, Congress will rectify this error. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY, supra
note 37, 523.18A n.2.
83. Section 523(b)-(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt that was ex-
cepted from discharge in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title,
or under the Bankruptcy Act, is dischargeable in a case under this title un-
less, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section, such debt is not dis-
chargeable in the case under this title.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor
shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or
(6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to
whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court deter-
mines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or
(6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer
debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the
court shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a
reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the court finds that the posi-
tion of the creditor was not substantially justified, except that the court shall
not award such costs and fees if special circumstances would make the award
unjust.
11 U.S.C. § 523(b)-(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Cf F & M Marquette Nat'l Bank v.
Richards, 780 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1985). In this case, the issue decided by the court
was whether the conversion of a bankruptcy case from Chapter 11 reorganization to
Chapter 7 liquidation provides creditors with a new 60 day period with which to file
claims to determine the dischargeability of debts. The court held that conversion
does afford an additional period to file claims. Id. at 25. Since a conversion from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 constitutes a new order for relief under section 348(a), the
court reasoned a new period was justified. Id. at 26. The court also noted that to
deny an additional period might cause a hardship for creditors since under Chapter
11 proceedings, creditors are much less likely to challenge the dischargeability of the
debt. Id.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982). See. e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Shadco,
Inc., 762 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1985).
85. But see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. Quadra, Ltd. v. Konchan (hi re Konchan), 36 Bankr. 393, 396 (Bankr. N.D.
Il1. 1984); Finance One of Fla., Inc. v. Scarbaci (Ii re Scarbaci), 34 Bankr. 344, 345
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riding concern is that an honest debtor should be exonerated
by the bankruptcy proceeding. 87  Conversely, the dis-
chargeability exceptions are intended to ensure that the relief
intended for honest debtors not be extended to dishonest
debtors. 88
The two recent Eighth Circuit cases address portions of the
dischargeability provision.8 9 The cases demonstrate that the
court is willing to go to great lengths in protecting the
debtor.90
B. In re Hunter
During the eighteen months of the survey period, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of dis-
chargeability in In re Hunter.91 The case specifically dealt with
how a prebankruptcy payment should be allocated to an un-
derlying debt.92 One portion of the debt was deemed nondis-
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Freeman (In re Freeman), 30 Bankr.
704 (Bankr. La. 1983); Heinold Commodities & Securities, Inc. v. Hunt (In re Hunt),
30 Bankr. 425, 436 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); Lake County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Marino
(In re Marino), 29 Bankr. 797, 799 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
87. See, e.g., Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975) (purpose of
Bankruptcy Act is to allow debtor to lead productive economic life).
88. See Castner Knott Co. v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 12 Bankr. 363, 370 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1981) (fraud exception to discharge designed to discourage fraud and
ensure that dishonest debtors not be protected by the Act).
89. Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1130 (when debt is incurred by fraud, debtor not entitled
to relief under the Act). Long, 774 F.2d at 882 (unless debtor acts with malice, dis-
charge will not be precluded). See II U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (6).
90. For instance, in Hunte, the court adopted an equitable approach in an effort
to strike a balance between the debtor-favoring policy and the justifiable expectations
of the creditor. Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1130.
In Long, the court seems to blur the distinction between protecting an honest
debtor and allowing the debtor free reign to misappropriate funds. Specifically, the
standard enunciated in Long appears to allow the conversion of property for the
debtor's own use, so long as the debtor's motives are pure. See Long, 774 F.2d at 880-
81.
91. 771 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1985).
92. Id. The court ruled that the bankruptcy court's determination that there was
no fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the debtor was not clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1129. The court also addressed issues concerning an obligation by the debtor
to pay attorneys' fees and interest on the debts. The court held that the status of the
debt created by the agreement to pay attorneys' fees depends on the dischargeability
of the primary debt. Id. at 1131. See Primm v. Foster (In re Foster), 38 Bankr. 639.
641-42 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); Chambers v. Chambers (In re Chambers), 36
Bankr. 42, 45-46 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1984); Cooley v. Sposa (In re Sposa), 31 Bankr.
307, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983). The Htniter court held that if the attornevs' fees
agreement was ancillary to the nondischargcablc portion of the debt then the credi-
tor would be entitled to recover them as they would be nondischargeable. lhier.
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chargeable by the bankruptcy court while another was
discharged.
93
The district court affirmed the findings of fact on dis-
chargeability but disagreed on allocation of the payment to the
debt.94 The district court concluded that since the two debts
had been consolidated into a single, indivisible note, the pro-
ceeds should be allocated between the two parts according to
their proportion of the whole. 9
5
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in
all respects. 96 In this case of first impression, the court fash-
ioned a remedy that it determined was fair to all parties. 97 The
court found that the underlying debt constituted a single bal-
771 F.2d at 1131-32. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine whether all or part of the attorneys' fees and interest should be awarded as part
of the nondischargeable debt. Id. at 1132.
93. The total debt of $27,000 was comprised of a $15,000 nondischarged por-
tion and a $12,000 discharged portion. Id. at 1128. The facts of the case show that
the debtor was a real estate broker engaged in speculative ventures. He called the
creditor and stated that he was trying to raise $30,000 to purchase some property.
Id. at 1127. The debtor was attempting to purchase an entire block in Orlando, Flor-
ida, for $300,000 - $500,000. The debtor indicated that for $15,000 the creditor
would become an equal partner in the venture. In fact, the $15,000 represented only
an investment in a small portion of the property. The full scope of the deal was never
explained to the creditor. Id. The creditor sent the $15,000, but when the deal even-
tually fell through, the debtor retained the money. Id. Later, the creditor, who was
the debtor's uncle by marriage, loaned the debtor an additional $12,000 to pay taxes
on other property. Id. When no payments were made, the creditor demanded his
money. Id. at 1127-28. The debtor gave a $27,000 mortgage on his house to satisfy
the entire debt. Id. at 1128. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed, netting
slightly over $12,000. The debtor reaffirmed the remaining debt of about $15,000
and agreed to pay the creditor's attorney's fees and interest. The debtor then filed
bankruptcy and the creditor instituted action to determine the dischargeability of the
debts. Id. The bankruptcy court found the $15,000 debt to be nondischargeable
because it was obtained by fraud. Jennen v. Hunter (In re Hunter) 36 Bankr. 28, 31
(Bankr. Minn. 1983). The bankruptcy court, however, found the $12,000 loan dis-
chargeable because the creditor had not relied on any misrepresentation of the
debtor. Id. The bankruptcy court held that the partial payment of $12,000 obtained
at the foreclosure should be subtracted from the nondischarged debt because that
was the first debt incurred. Id. at 32. The bankruptcy court justified its decision by
applying the "first in first out" principle. See Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1129. Since Con-
gress mandates narrow construction of nondischargeability, the bankruptcy court de-
termined this to be a fair result. 36 Bankr. at 32.
94. Jennen v. Hunter (It re Hunter), 52 Bankr. 912, 915-16 (D. Minn. 1984).
95. Id. at 916. It is interesting to note that the two lower courts involved in this
case cite no authority upon which to base their decisions. See Hunter, 52 Bankr. at
915-16; Hunter, 36 Bankr. at 31-32.
96. Employing the clearly erroneous standard, the Eighth Circuit refused to dis-
turb the findings on dischargeability. Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1129.
97. See id. at 1130; cf Stevenson v. Stevenson Assoc., Inc. (lit re Stevenson Assoc.,
1986]
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ance even though incurred separately. 98 The debts were
treated differently only because of "the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code which makes some debts nondischargeable
and others dischargeable." 99 The court found that apportion-
ment would balance the relevant policy objectives by fully
compensating the creditor for the fraudulent debt while releas-
ing the debtor from the nonfraudulent debt.'
00
Under the authority cited by the Eighth Circuit, this case was
correctly decided. Since the court refused to overturn the fac-
tual determinations made by the bankruptcy court, it had to
protect the debtor in relation to the discharged debt.' 0 ' Simi-
larly, applying the proceeds only to the nondischarged debts
would have contravened the clear language of section
523(a)(6).' 0
2
Inc.), 777 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy court possesses equitable pow-
ers).
The Eighth Circuit recognized three possible approaches to solving the appor-
tionment problem. The first approach was the "first in first out" approach used by
the bankrukptcy court. Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1129-30. The debtor advocated this ap-
proach as it would have allowed him to escape most of the nondischarged debt. Id.;
see Hunter 36 Bankr. at 32. The Eighth Circuit rejected this approach because only
honest debtors are entitled to protection under the Code. Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1130.
The court said, "when dishonesty is demonstrated with respect to a specific debt, the
debtor 'is no longer entitled to the benefit of debtor rehabilitation policy considera-
tions.' " Id. (quoting In re Wilson, 12 Bankr. 363, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981)).
The second possibility rejected by the court called for total application of the
proceeds to the discharged debt. Id. at 1130. This approach was advocated by the
creditor as it would have resulted in maximum return. The court said this approach
was punitive in nature and therefore contravened the Code protections intended for
honest debtors. Id.
The final approach was to apportion the debt between the dischargeable and
nondischargeable portions. Id. The court felt this best balanced the relevant inter-
ests and was the "remedy best suited to the harm." Id. (quoting Garnatz v. Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978)).
98. 771 F.2d at 1130.
99. Id. at 1131.
100. Id.
101. See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTCy, supra note 37, 523.05A (15th ed.
1984) (notes that the statute must be liberally construed in favor of the debtor).
The second approach rejected by the Eighth Circuit would clearly have violated
this mandate. See Hunter at 1130 (punitive approach inappropriate).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) mandates that a debt incurred in this manner is not
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C. In re Long
The second Eighth Circuit case addressing the issue of dis-
chargeability was In re Long. 13 The debtor's conduct in Long
appears more egregious than that in Hunter, but the court held,
however, that the entire debt was dischargeable.10 4
In Long, the debtor borrowed considerable sums to maintain
the business. 10 5 The loans were, however, unable to sustain
the business. In an effort to save the failing business, the
debtor filed for reorganization under Chapter 11.106 To pay
reorganization expenses, the debtor transferred money from
the creditor's secured collateral account.' 0 7 The reorganiza-
tion, however, failed, and the case was converted to Chapter
7.108
The creditor sought to prevent discharge of the loan. The
creditor argued that the loan was obtained fraudulently by mis-
representing the value of the inventory.' 09 Additionally, the
creditor alleged that the transfer of money from the secured
collateral account was a "wilfull and malicious" conversion of
property.110 The court rejected the creditor's claims and af-
103. 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 882. "Debtors who willfully break security agreements are testing the
outer bounds of their right to a fresh start, but unless they act with malice by intending
orfuly expecting to harm the economic interests of the creditor, such a breach of con-
tract does not, in and of itself, preclude a discharge." Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 876. The debtor was A. & C. Johnson, a wholesaler of home improve-
ment products. The president and majority stockholder, Long, however, had person-
ally guaranteed the loans, thereby bringing himself within section 523. Id.
106. Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 44 Bankr. 300,
304 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
107. Long, 774 F.2d at 876. Long used the funds to pay attorney's fees and other
reorganization costs. Id.
108. Long, 44 Bankr. at 304.
109. Long, 774 F.2d at 877-78; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. II
1984). The creditor argued that discharge should be disallowed on the ground that
the debtor fraudulently misrepresented the value of its inventory. Long, 774 F.2d at
877. The debtor's settled practice was to enter the price paid for inventory as market
value of manufacturer's list price, even if the price actually paid was different. Id.
The bankruptcy judge found an inherently inflationary effect on the valuation of the
inventory whenever items of inventory were purchased at a discount. 44 Bankr. at
309. For instance, on one occasion, the debtor made a large purchase at a 90%
saving. The cost, however, was assigned at the full value because that was the price
previously used to calculate the item. 774 F.2d at 877.
110. Long, 774 F.2d at 879. The loan agreement had stated that proceeds from
the secured accounts receivable were to be deposited in a special account for pay-
ment on the loan and were not to be commingled with the debtor's other funds.
The creditor also argued that the debts should not be discharged because the
19861
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firmed the discharge of all the debts. The court found that the
debtor lacked the requisite "intent to deceive."'II
The court prefaced its ruling with a brief discussion of the
history of conversion under the dischargeability provision of
the statute. The court determined that the statute requires the
conversion to be both willful and malicious."12 The standard
articulated by the court states that "nondischargeability turns
on whether the conduct is (1) headstrong and knowing ("will-
ful") and, (2) targeted at the creditor ("malicious"), at least in
the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause
financial harm."'"t 3 In applying this standard, the court said
that the debtor's conduct was "unquestionably willful.' "'14 The
court, however, did not believe that the debtor's actions were
"malicious" in the context of the court's definition of the
term. "15
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the va-
ried case law on "willful and malicious" conversion. An early
Supreme Court decision held that any intentional act which is
wrongful and causes injury is "willful and malicious." ' 16 Sub-
sequently, the Supreme Court held that conversion by breach
of contract does not affect dischargeability absent "aggravated
"channeling of income from a segregated collateral account,. . . constitutes defalca-
tion or fraud by a fiduciary .... " Id. at 878; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1982).
The court rejected this contention because the term "fiduciary" only applies to ex-
press trusts in bankruptcy law. Long, 774 F.2d at 878-79. It held that "Barclays can-
not soundly invoke the fiduciary bar against discharge of Long's obligation." Id. at
879.
111. Long, 774 F.2d at 882.
112. Id. at 880-81.
Congress tells us in § 523(a)(6) that malice and willfulness are two different
characteristics. They should not be lumped together to create an amor-
phous standard to prevent discharge for any conduct that may be judicially
considered to be deporable. We are convinced that if malice, as it is used in
§ 523(a) (6), is to have any meaning independent of willful it must apply only
to conduct more culpable than that which is in reckless disregard of credi-
tors' economic interests and expectancies, as distinguished from mere legal
rights.
Id.
113. Id. at 881
114. Id. The court recognized that Long knew he was breaching the loan agree-
ment by transferring funds from the collateral account. Id.
115. Id. at 881-82. The court's definition requires the debtor to know or expect
his conduct to cause financial harm to the creditor. In the present case, however, the
creditor would have realized "hundreds of thousands of dollars" if Long's attempt to
save the business had been successful. Id. at 882.
116. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
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features."' 17 Two distinct lines of cases have evolved from this
"conflict." One line holds that any "intentional harm" to a
creditor's legal rights, constitutes a "willful and malicious"
conversion. I"8 The second line holds that a breach of contract
constitutes a "technical conversion" and the creditor must
show specific intent to harm." 19 The Eighth Circuit adopted
the strict malice test.1
20
By following the majority rule on this issue, 121 the Long case
117. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Corp., 293 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1934).
118. Long, 774 F.2d at 880; see also United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr.
766 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
119. Long, 774 F.2d at 880; see also Impulsora Del Territoria v. Cecchini (In re
Cecchini), 37 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1984), rev'd. 772 F.2d 1493, substituted
opinion, 780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Gallandet, 46 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1985); In re Levitan, 46 Bankr. 380 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Simpson, 29 Bankr.
202 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
120. The Eighth Circuit found that Congress intended the standard in Tinker to be
abolished. Long, 774 F.2d at 879 n.4; see H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5787, 5963, 6320-2 1. The court noted that
"(u)nder this paragraph 'willful' means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and
to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard'
standard, they are overruled." H.R. Rep. No. 95-959, Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977); S.
Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79 (1978), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5787, 6320 (1978).
Cases from other jurisdictions have held that "(a) careful reading of Tinker...
does not disclose such a 'looser standard,' either for wilfulness or malice." Kuchin-
sky v. Trudeau (In re Trudeau), 35 Bankr. 185, 187 (Bankr. Mass. 1983); accord
United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 35 Bankr. 766, 771-72 (N.D. Ill.
1983). The Tinker court merely defined willful as "intentional and voluntary." Tinker,
193 U.S. at 485.
The Trudeau court stated:
[I]n United States v. Reed, 86 Fed. 308, it was held that malice consisted in the
willful doing of an act which the person doing it knows is liable to injure
another, regardless of the consequences; and a malignant spirit or a specific
intention to hurt a particular person is not an essential element. Upon that
principle, we think a willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an
act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which
necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done
willfully and maliciously, so as to come within the exception.
Trudeau, 35 Bankr. at 187.
The Trudeau court held that because of this language, the comments of Congress
"should be reserved only for those cases that have misinterpreted Tinker to equate
malice with recklessness." 35 Bankr. at 187. But see Cecchini, 37 Bankr. at 675; Win-
kleman v. Fiedler (In re Fiedler), 28 Bankr. 28, 31 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982); Hodges. 4
Bankr. at 514-15.
121. Long, 774 F.2d at 880-81. Contra Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766. See generallV 1984
Annual Survey of Bankruptcy, Recent Developments in Decisions, Section 523-Excep-
tions to Discharge, 265, 288.
A distinct split has developed in American jurisdictions on whether to interpret
the phrase "willful and malicious" to mean an intentional act which causes injury, see
1986]
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seems to be a correct statement of the standard for denying
discharge for conversion of property. The court, however,
misapprehended the meaning of malice under the Act and ig-
nored a clear trend in recent cases. The trend of the law seems
to be that Congress intended implied or constructive malice to
be applied in nondischargeability cases.1 22 Nothing in the leg-
islative history of section 523(a)(6) states that the malice in the
statute must be an actual intent to do harm. 23 A standard of
implied or constructive malice is consistent with the historical
policy of discharging honest debtors. 24 The implied malice
standard also eases the difficulty of proving subjective intent
and malice. 125
An implied malice test is in line with other types of cases
decided under section 523(a)(c). For instance, at least one
court held that damages resulting from an assault and a battery
would be presumed to be intentional and malicious and not
dischargeable.' 26 The standard enunciated by the Long court is
generally Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766; Trudeau, 35 Bankr. 185; Car Village Buick-Opel, Inc. v.
DeRosa (In re DeRosa), 20 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. N.Y. 1982); Simmons, 9 Bankr. 62; Bir-
mingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. McGiboney (In re McGiboney), 8 Bankr. 987 (Bankr.
Ala. 1981); The Farmers Bank v. McCloud (In re McCloud), 7 Bankr. 819 (Bankr.
Tenn. 1980); or an act performed with intent to cause injury. See Long, 774 F.2d 875;
In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1985); Cecchini, 37 Bankr. 671; In re Hinkle, 9
Bankr. 283 (Bankr. Md. 1981); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Hawkins (In re Hawkins),
6 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. Ky. 1980); Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513.
The court in Long clearly followed this second approach, in demanding actual
intent to harm. "Knowledge that legal rights are being violated is insufficient to es-
tablish malice, absent some additional aggravated circumstances .
Long, 774 F.2d at 880-81.
122. 1984 Recent Developments, supra note 121, at 288; see also Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766.
In its anaylsis, the Nelson court determined that only part of the Tinker standard had
been overruled and that the constructive malice part of the case was still viable. Id. at
774-75.
123. Nelson, 35 Bankr. at 771; see also United Va. Bank v. Fussel (In re Fussell), 15
Bankr. 1016, 1022 (W.D. Va. 1981); 1984 Recent Developments, supra note 121, at 292-
93.
124. Nelson, 35 Bankr. at 776.
125. Id.; but see Long, 774 F.2d at 881. This factor was dismissed by the Long court,
which said that "(w)hile intentional harm may be very difficult to establish, the likeli-
hood of harm in an objective sense may be considered in evaluating intent." Id.
126. Trudeau, 35 Bankr. at 187-88; but see Pargas v. Poore (In re Poore), 37 Bankr.
246 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
The conduct of the Defendant clearly approaches the outer limits of
negligence. It was certainly wanton and in reckless disregard of the lives
and safety of others. Further, his conduct was well within the area where
criminal punishment is appropriate. The question, however, is whether it is
. . . willful and malicious injury by the Debtor to another. within the
ambit of II U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
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rigorous and will not be met, absent actual subjective intent on
the part of the debtor to willfully and maliciously convert the
creditor's funds. In its efforts to protect the debtor, the court
overlooked the justifiable expectations of the creditor.
The most significant area of development has occurred in
the cases of damage arising from drunk driving.1 27 Under sec-
tion 523(a)(6) the cases are split on whether such damages
should be dischargeable. 28 A 1984 amendment solved this
Id. at 247. The court in Poore went on to hold that the debt was dischargeable. Id. at
250.
127. See Moraes v. Adams (In re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (voluntary
acts of drinking and driving constitute conduct sufficiently intentional to support will-
fulness and malice and thus damages were nondischargeable). But see Compos, 768
F.2d 1155 (debt was dischargeable where creditors proved that an intoxicated
driver's conduct was in reckless disregard of the rights and did not prove that debtor
intended to injure).
128. Cases which allowed discharge include: Gunther v. Kuepper (In re Kuepper),
36 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983); Marwell Trucking, Inc. v. Davis (In re Davis),
26 Bankr. 580 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Lee v. Silas (In re Silas), 24 Bankr. 771 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1982); In re Maney, 23 Bankr. 61 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982); Castiglia v.
Morgan (In re Morgan), 22 Bankr. 38 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982); Security Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Rainey (In re Rainey), I Bankr. 569 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979).
Cases, on the other hand, which disallowed discharge include: Caldarelli v. Cal-
laway (In re Callaway), 41 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Tobler v. Carey (In re
Carey), 35 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); Burns v. Cloutier (In re Cloutier), 33
Bankr. 18 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); Prosch v. Wooten (In re Wooten), 30 Bankr. 357
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Long v. Greenwell (In re Greenwell), 21 Bankr. 419 (S.D.
Ohio 1982). One court has stated:
Whether driving while intoxicated-with or without knowledge of the
probable consequences-constitutes conduct that is "willful" and "mali-
cious" would present a close question if we were limited in our interpreta-
tion of section 523(a)(6) to the language of that subsection and the
legislative history in existence at the time the matter was decided in the dis-
trict court.
Adams, 761 F.2d at 1426 (interpreting section 523(a)(9) to give rise to a presumption
of malice in cases of debts arising from drunk driving accidents)
However, two months after judgment was entered Congress answered the
question in the form of an amendment to Title 11. In July of 1984, Con-
gress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) which, in our view, prescribes the man-
ner in which we must construe section 523(a)(6). See ,0ay Dep't Stores Co. v.
Smith, 572 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837,
99 S. Ct. 122, 58 L.Ed.2d 134 (1978)(subsequent amendment and its legisla-
tive history, though not controlling, is nonetheless entitled to substantial
weight in construing the eariler law). Section 523(a)(9) provides explicitly
that debts arising from liabilities incurred as a result of drunk driving are
nondischargeable. The legislative history underlying the 1984 amendment
makes it clear that by enacting the amendment, Congress intended to clarify
preexisting law. . . . In addition to the expression of Congressional intent
underlying section 523(a)(9), we are influenced by the fact that at the time
that amendment was enacted there was a clear conflict among the nisi prius
courts, in this case the bankruptcy courts, over the meaning of section
523(a)(6). See pp. 1425-1426, supra. With respect to statutory construction,
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problem with the revision of subsection nine. 129 This section
makes it clear that malice is to be presumed and the debts are
not discharged.13 0 Cases construing the nondischargeability of
debts arising from drunk driving have held that malice may be
implied.
Finally, allowing an implied or constructive malice test helps
effectuate the policy underlying the preferred position of se-
cured creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.' 3' A test that re-
quires actual subjective malice to be proved renders the
security interest meaningless and places the secured creditor
in no better position than the unsecured creditor.13 2
In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit in Long enunciated a stan-
dard that is extremely difficult to attain and that invites abuse.
The policy of protecting the debtor was placed at such a pre-
mium in this case that all other considerations were
we view conflict among courts as an indication that a subsequent amend-
ment is intended to clarify, rather than change, the existing law.
Id. at 1426-27 (footnote omitted). Contra Compos, 768 F.2d 1155 (requires proof of
intent to injure before a debt is held nondischargeable). Since the revised section 9
had not officially gone into effect, the court had to decide the case under section 6.
Unlike the Adams court, however, the Compos court declined to recognize the amend-
ment persuasively.
129. See supra note 82 (quotes section 523).
130. In describing the various Bankruptcy Code Amendments that were being
adopted, the Chairman of the House Committee of the Judiciary stated that "[section
523(a)(9)] clarifies present law relating to the nondischargeability of debts incurred
by drunk drivers. Debts incurred by persons driving while intoxicated are presumed
to be willfully and maliciously incurred under this provision." 130 Cong. Rec.
H7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 576, 577.
. . .remarks of Senator DeConcini on the Senate floor in support of his
proposed amendment to change the existing law to deny bankruptcy dis-
charges to debtors who have incurred liabilities for injury and damage to
persons and property resulting from driving while intoxicated:
n . I have an amendment that would change the standard and would
not permit discharge in bankruptcy of obligations arising from the infliction
of willful, wanton, or reckless injury. Today, there exists in the bankruptcy
statute an unconscionable loophole which makes it possible for drunk driv-
ers or others who have acted with willful, wanton, or reckless conduct and
who have injured, killed, or caused property damage to others to escape
civil liability for their actions by having their judgment debt discharged in
Federal bankruptcy court. This loophole affords opportunity for scandalous
abuse . . . . (citations omitted).
Dreiling, 768 F.2d at 1158.
131. Nelson, 35 Bankr. at 776. The intent to harm standard places a nearly insur-
mountable burden on creditors by allowing the debtor to misappropriate the collat-
eral and then forcing the creditor to prove subjective intent to harm. Id. In effect,
this can destroy the creditor's security interest because the creditor will have little
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subordinated. A standard that would allow implied malice,
which is the trend of the law, would still allow adequate protec-
tion to the debtor who in good faith technically converts prop-
erty, 33 while offering a greater measure of protection to the
secured creditor who is relying on the pledged property when
making loans. 1
34
III. ATTEMPTS TO AVOID LIENS CREATED
BY MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION
In two recent cases, the Eighth Circuit interpreted section
522(f) of the Code, which allows a debtor to avoid liens placed
on certain property.' 35 In the first case, In re Thompson, the
court interpreted the provision allowing liens to be avoided if
the property involved is primarily for personal use.'
36
In the second case, Boyd v. Robinson, 137 the court held that a
lien created by a family court to protect one party of a divorce
133. 1984 Recent Developments, supra note 121, § 523, at 293; see Nelson, 35 Bankr. at
776; see also Dunkinson v. Ricketts (In re Ricketts), 40 Bankr. 676 (Bankr. D. Md.
1984). A technical conversion has been defined to be one that lacks the elements of
willfullness and maliciousness necessary to avoid discharge. The Howard Bank v.
Davis (In re Davis), 11 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980).
134. See Nelson, 35 Bankr. at 776.
135. Section 522(f) provides, in pertinent part:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been enti-
tled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, orjewelry
that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
136. See In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1984). In Thompson, the court
held that a lien on certain pigs owned by the debtor/farmer was not avoidable be-
cause the pigs could not properly be considered property used primarily for per-
sonal, family or household use. Id. at 631; see I I U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (1982). The
court noted that the general purpose of the lien avoidance provision is to allow debt-
ors to extricate themselves from adhesion contracts. 750 F.2d at 630. See S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwvs
5787, 6087-88 (discusses problem of adhesion contracts and the need to protect
debtors). The court concluded that only those goods necessary to the debtor's new
beginning and that were of relatively little value were to be exempt from liens. 750
F.2d at 631. The court held that the pigs, which were really business property of the
debtor, did not fit into this category. Id.
137. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
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was not avoidable. 38 In order to avoid a lien under section
522(0(1), it must be established that (1) the lien attach to an
interest of the debtor in exempt property; and (2) the lien must
be a judicial lien.' 3 9 The Boyd court held that the first require-
ment was not satisfied since the interest created in the nonresi-
dent spouse was preexisting, and therefore, did not attach to
any part of the debtor's property. 4
0
Since the Boyd court held that the lien did not attach to an
interest of the debtor in exempt property, it logically followed
that the lien could not be avoided. 41 This outcome is sound
both in logic and policy. Not only does this rule allow the
property of the parties to be treated separately, it also protects
the lienholder from being deprived of that person's rightful
138. Id. at 1113-14.
139. Id. at 1113.
140. Id. at 1113-14. The majority of the courts that have addressed this issue have
similarly held that a former spouse's lien on the debtor's homestead may not be
avoided. See In re Maus, 48 Bankr. 948 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985); Seablom v. Seablom
(In re Seablom), 45 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); In re Thomas, 32 Bankr. 11
(Bankr. D. Or. 1983); In re Graham, 28 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); McCor-
mick v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., 22 Bankr. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Cowan v. Cowan
(In re Scott), 12 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); Dunn v. Dunn (In re Dunn), 10
Bankr. 385 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981). Cf In re Chesnut, 50 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1985) (lien on homestead created in favor of attorney who represented spouse
in dissolution is avoidable because it does not represent a preexisting property inter-
est); Thomas v. Lyles (In re Thomas), 47 Bankr. 27, 33 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984) (bank-
ruptcy court has no power to modify separate property interest of ex-spouse in
portion of military pension); Butts v. Butts (In re Butts), 46 Bankr. 292, 296 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985) (equitable lien to protect one spouse where the other spouse obtained
a favorable settlement by duplicity and subsequently tried to avoid their obligation by
filing bankruptcy).
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982) (lien avoidance) with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (nondischargeability of marital obligations). The cases deal-
ing with lien avoidance in this context often touch on the nondischargeability of mar-
ital obligations as an additional basis for holding the lien unavoidable. The doctrines
have often become intertwined.
Holding a lien in favor of the nonresident ex-spouse unavoidable helps to effec-
tuate the relevant policies behind both sections.
141. 741 F.2d at 1114. "The proposition that a spouse has a property interest in
homestead property acquired during the marriage is hardly startling or unique to
Minnesota." Id. Judge Ross, in his dissent, reasoned that the preexisting property
interest held by the nonresident former spouse was extinguished at the time of the
marriage dissolution. Id. at 1115. The lien created at the time was a new interest and
therefore attached to an interest in exempt property. Id.
Judge Ross' dissent, however, ignores the proposition that the lien in favor of
the nonresident spouse merely represents a fbrm of division of the marital property
under state law. Since the lien only represented the preexisting and continuing inter-
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share of the marital property by a dishonest spouse who inten-
tionally files bankruptcy for the purpose of avoiding the obliga-
tion of a property settlement.1
42
In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit joined the other courts that
have addressed this issue in holding that a lien on a homestead
created in favor of a former spouse represents a preexisting
interest. As a result, the lien is not avoidable under section
522(f)(1).
IV. ADEQUATE PROTECTION
In a trilogy of recent cases, the court addressed the issue of
adequate protection in various situations. In re Martin' 4 3 dealt
with the issue of adequate protection of a creditor under a plan
for reorganization.' 44 In Martin, the debtors/farmers filed pe-
titions for reorganization under Chapter 11.145 Later, the
debtors requested the use of cash collateral to finance contin-
ued operation and to plant the next year's crop. 14 6 In order to
obtain the needed cash, the debtors wanted to sell mortgaged
grain that was stored on their premises in exchange for a first
lien on the next year's crop and an assignment of the proceeds
of their Federal Crop Insurance policies. 147 The computed
value of the nonexistent crop was deemed to exceed the value
of the requested collateral. i48 The bankruptcy court granted
142. See, e.g., Butts, 46 Bankr. at 296; but see Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1116 (Ross, J., dis-
senting) ("While I agree that permitting avoidance of this lien is a harsh result, I
cannot in conscience join the majority. This type of decision is for Congress. Once
Congress has decided, its judgment should be respected.").
143. 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985).
144. Section 361 provides, in pertinent part:
When adequate protection is required. . . such adequate protection may be
provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such en-
tity, to the extent that the stay . . . [or] use, . . . results in a decrease in the
value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the
extent that such . . . use.., results in a decrease in the value of such en-
tity's interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, . . . as will result in the realization by
such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such
property.
II U.S.C. § 361 (1982).
145. Martin, 761 F.2d at 473.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 473-74. The bankruptcy court foiund that the creditors were "virtually
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the debtor's motion and the creditor appealed. 149 The district
court reversed, holding the proposed lien and assignment of
insurance on the unplanted crop adequately protected the
creditor. 15
0
On appeal, the court held that adequate protection of the
creditor is a question of fact.15 1 The court, after lengthy dis-
cussion, remanded the case to the bankruptcy court with in-
structions to apply the correct legal standard and determine if
there was, in fact, adequate protection.
52
In formulating the legal standard by which adequate protec-
tion is to be determined, the court noted that the proposal for
the use of collateral, as nearly as possible, provide the creditor
with the benefit of his bargain. 53 The court formulated a
three-part standard that a bankruptcy court must follow in de-
termining if the plan provides adequate protection. 54 First,
the court must establish the value of the secured creditor's in-
terest. 55 The court must then identify the risks to the secured
creditor's value resulting from the debtor's proposed use of
the collateral. 156 Lastly, the bankruptcy court must determine
whether the debtor's proposal protects the "value as nearly as
possible against risks to that value consistent with the concept
certain" to get a return of their interest because they had a first lien on the nonexis-
tent crop and had an interest in the Federal Crop Insurance policy. Id.
149. Id.
150. A threshold issue addressed by the court was whether the issue was moot
because the case was not argued until after the disputed crop year had come to an
end. Id. The court held that the case fell within the "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review" exception to the mootness rule. Id.; see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602-03 (1982); Flittie v. Erickson, 724 F.2d 80, 82 (8th Cir.
1983).
151. Martin, 761 F.2d at 474.
152. Id. at 478-79.
153. Id. at 476; (quoting In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435
(9th Cir. 1984)). The court examined the legislative history behind section 361 and
found that the concept of adequate protection was a flexible one. Martin, 761 F.2d at
476. The court cautioned, however, that the flexibility should not work to the detri-
ment of the secured creditor and that the adequate protection provided must be the
"indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's interest. Id.
154. Martin, 761 F.2d at 476-77.
155. Id. The bankruptcy court, in this case, failed to do that. In computing the
value, the court did not use any documentary evidence to back up the results. Id.
156. Id. Again the bankruptcy court failed to identify any of the attendant risks to
the creditor. The proposed collateral was a nonexistent cash grain crop. Fhe bank-
ruptcy court failed to take into account many, contingencies that might have occurred
which would have damaged or destroyed the creditor's interest. Id.
(Vol. 12
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of indubitable equivalence."' 157 Since the bankruptcy court did
not consider the case by the appropriate standard, the court
remanded for a factual determination.158 Although only dicta,
the court expressed obvious disapproval for allowing the
debtor to speculate with the creditor's collateral.' 59
The obvious implication of this case is to limit the ability of
bankruptcy judges to approve plans as providing adequate
protection where the protection afforded the secured creditor
is speculative. 160 The court's ruling will force the bankruptcy
courts to have objective justification for allowing debtors to
risk creditor's interests.
The second case that dealt with this issue was In re Monnier
Brothers. 161 In Monnier, the debtors were loaned large amounts
of money by the creditor for their farming operation. 162 The
debtor eventually filed for reorganization under Chapter 11.163
The court invoked the "cram down"'164 provision and affirmed
157. Id. Since this third factor is an incorporation of the first two, it is obvious that
the bankruptcy court did not consider it. Id.
158. Id. at 478-79. The court remanded for a factual determination, but said in
dicta: "[W]e believe that the bankruptcy court 'accord(ed) insufficient weight to the
language of the statute and the Congressional goal of affording the secured creditor
the benefit of its bargaining.' " Id. at 478.
159. See id. at 477.
160. See id.
161. 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 1337. The note was secured by a mortgage upon the debtor's farm-
land. The loan agreements set the interest rate at 13% per annum, with an increase
to 15% on overdue installments. Id.
163. Id.
164. See 755 F.2d at 1338. The "cramdown" provision is embodied in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1984). The provision allows the court to adopt a plan of
reorganization over the objection of a creditor. The court quoted the provision as
follows:
(b)(1) the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable,
with respect to each [dissenting] class . ..
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor
or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such
claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of
such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property; [or]
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the plan over the creditor's objection.16 5 The plan called for a
reduction of the interest rate paid to the creditor. The district
court affirmed confirmation of the plan but reversed the inter-
est determination. 66 The district court held that the debtor
should repay the loan at the rate set out in the mortgage.1
67
In its discussion on the issue, the Eighth Circuit suggested
that the Code is not very helpful in determining the appropri-
ate interest rate. 68 The court further noted that neither party
in this case had been of much assistance to the court in deter-
mining the appropriate interest rate. 69 The court went on to
affirm the district court's allowance of the contract rate in this
case, stating merely that the court had not erred in its
determination. ' 70
For the second time in the survey period, the court refused
to squarely address the adequate protection issue. In both
Id. at 1338 n.2. (emphasis added).
It should be noted that ten other classes of creditors, most of whom held fully
secured claims, accepted the plan. Id. at 1337. The objecting creditor opposed be-
cause the plan did not provide for immediate payment and because the court
changed the interest terms of the note. Id. at 1338. Under the confirmed plan, the
creditor would receive payments at the default rate for the time period prior to the
confirmation and would receive 10.5% for the remainder. Id. The interest rate de-
termined by the bankruptcy court represented the current United States Treasury
discount rate. Id.
165. Id. at 1338.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. One of the Code's few clues about what factors to take into account in
selecting an appropriate interest rate appears in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); that section
states that a plan may be confirmed over the objections of a secured creditor if the
plan affords the creditor the "indubitable equivalent" of his claim. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). Legislative history indicates Congress intended this phrase to
take on the meaning given it by Judge Learned Hand in In re Mlurel Htolding Co., 75
F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935). Mariner, which is cited in .Monnie, quoted and analyzed
Judge Hand's commentary on this issue.
Judge Hand concluded that the creditor's right "to get his money or at least
the property" may be denied under a plan for reorganization only if the
debtor provides "a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence." Suich a
substitute clearly must both compensate for preseut value and isire the safety of the
principal. (emphasis in original)
Monnier, 755 F.2d at 1339 (quoting .lariuer, 734 F.2d at 433).
169. See Monnier, 755 F.2d at 1339. The creditor had insisted that since it was
oversecured, it was entitled to the contract rate as a matter of law. Id. at 1338. Con-
versely, the debtor had asserted that the discount rate was appropriate (quoting .lari-
ner, 735 F.2d at 443). The court re jected both of these positions. Id.
170. Id. The court seemed to limit its holding to the facts. Since the parties had
not supplied the court with appropriate data to determine a fair interest rate. the
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Martin and Monnier, the court favorably cited a recent Ninth
Circuit case which did not address the issue, without expressly
adopting or rejecting its analysis.' 7' That discussion was left
to the third significant Eighth Circuit case on this issue.
The Eighth Circuit decided In re Briggs Transportation Co. 172
at the end of the survey period. The issue addressed by the
court in Briggs was "whether the concept of 'adequate protec-
tion' found in 11 U.S.C. §§ 361 and 362 entitles undersecured
creditors as a matter of law to interest payments from a debtor
to compensate the creditors for lost opportunity costs due to
the delay in reinvesting the collateral's liquidated value caused
by an automatic stay."1 73 The bankruptcy court held that in-
terest was not available as adequate protection.1 74 The district
court reversed, holding that undersecured creditors were enti-
tled to interest as a matter of law.1 75 The Eighth Circuit held
that neither of these positions was correct.' 76 The court chose
a middle position which affirmed the award of interest in this
case, but the court did not require or deny it as a matter of law
in any other cases.
1 77
171. Aariner, 734 F.2d at 433-34; see Alartin, 761 F.2d at 476; Monnier, 755 F.2d at
1339.
172. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
173. Id. at 1340. Briefly stated, the facts of the case show that the debtor filed a
petition for reorganization under which the complaining creditors held a secured
claim on some of the debtor's property. Id. at 1391. Both creditors' claims were
undersecured. The creditors sought "adequate protection in the form of interest
payments to compensate for their 'lost opportunity costs.' " Id.
174. Id.; see Lend Lease v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 35 Bankr.
210, 216-17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
175. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1341. The district court adopted the rationale of.lariner,
734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1983), which stated that a secured creditor "is entitled to
compensation for the delay in enforcing its rights during the interim between the
petition and confirmation of the plan." Id. at 435.
176. See Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1350-51.
177. The court noted that "adequate protection" must be a flexible concept. Id.
at 1348. Therefore, the court reasoned an award of interest should be determined
on a case by case basis:
We recognize that a rule which directs courts to approach adequate protec-
tion analyses on a case-by-case basis provides minimal guidance for future
reconstruction by courts of a secured creditor's bargain for adequate protec-
tion purposes. However, the developing case law applying the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 has already devised a broad variety of equita-
ble considerations which provide a guide for future cases. Obviously. situa-
tions involving a greatly oversecured claim will be quite different from cases
such as this involving undersecured claims, and a value determination for
automatic stay purposes is not necessarily the same as value determined for
another purpose, such as confirming a p'lan.
Id. at 1349. The court concluded (hat a per se rule was inappropriate:
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The Eighth Circuit noted that a split of authority exists in
the courts on this issue.' 78 Declining to follow either of the
existing lines of authority, the court adopted a case-by-case
approach. 
79
Vigorously dissenting, Judge Gibson argued that the major-
ity's approach creates uncertainty and provides no guidance
for bankruptcy courts in their determination of this issue.' 80
As a result of the majority's decision in Briggs, lower courts
have great latitude in deciding the issue of adequate protec-
tion. This comports with Martin, which pointed out that ade-
quate protection is essentially a fact question which must be
resolved by the fact finder.' 8 ' However, Briggs also creates a
great uncertainty by providing wide discretion without provid-
ing guidance on how it should be resolved.' 82 This latitude
After careful consideration of the Bankruptcy Code's language and legisla-
tive history and of underlying policy considerations, we cannot hold as a
matter of law that a creditor is always entitled to compensation for the delay
in enforcing its foreclosure rights during the interim period between filing
of a petition and confirmation of a plan. Although the concept of adequate
protection under sections 361 and 362 requires the court to protect the
creditor's allowed secured claim by compensating for any loss of value of
the collateral, what constitutes adequate protection in a particular case is a
question whose resolution is best left to the knowledge and expertise of the
bankruptcy court.
Id. at 1350-51.
178. Id. at 1342. Compare American Mariner Indus., 734 F.2d at 435 (the payment of
interest one method of providing adequate protection) with U.S. v. Smithfield Estates
(In re Smithfield Estates), 48 Bankr. 910, 914-15 n.8 (Bankr. R.I. 1985) (declining to
award interest as part of the creditor's adequate protection). The Mariner rationale
has been applied in a number of recent cases and seems to be the trend of the cases.
See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436, 1440-41 (4th
Cir. 1985).
179. 780 F.2d at 1350-51. Since adequate protection is deemed to be a flexible
concept by the Eighth Circuit, the court reasoned it was appropriate to analyze the
interest question on a case-by-case basis. See id.
180. Id. at 1351 (Gibson,J., dissenting). Judge Gibson argued that the preferable
course was that adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Mlariner 1d. Mariner makes clear that
the creditor is entitled to some compensation as a matter of law. See llariner, 734
F.2d at 435. The compensation need not take the form of regularly recurring interest
payments but must simply compensate the creditor for future use of the collateral's
value. Id.; see Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351. Judge Gibson argues that this is the most
sensible approach since it assures protection of creditors and also gives the bank-
ruptcy court's guidance on the issue of interest entitlement. See id. at 1351-52.
Under the Mariner rule, the bankruptcy court need only decide what form the protec-
tion is to take and not whether it should be awarded in the first instance. See id.: but
see Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1350 n.12 (majority opinion charges that the dissent reads
Mariner case-by-case approach too narrowly).
181. Martin, 761 F.2d at 474.
182. The court did note that a determination depended on the balancing of com-
peting interests. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1349. The court noted Faciors such as the "na-
[Vol. 12
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can create uncertainty and hesitancy in planning by secured
creditors who will be unsure of the amount and type of protec-
tion they will be afforded in the event a debtor files for
reorganization. 1 83
V. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Bad Faith Filing of Involuntary Petitions
In the eighteen month period covered by this survey, the
court issued several other significant opinions. In Basin Electric
Power Cooperative v. Midwest Processing Co., 184 the court construed
section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 85 In Basin Electric,
a single creditor filed an involuntary petition against the
debtor, knowing that the debtor had more than twelve credi-
tors. t8 6 The court affirmed the finding that the petition had
been filed in bad faith and should therefore be dismissed.
187
By adopting the good faith requirement in filing requirements,
the court emphasized that any other holding would make the
three creditor filing requirement a meaningless formality.
88
ture of the collateral and the proposed use of the collateral .... ." as being
significant. Id. The court did not, however, give any concrete guidance on this issue.
183. 780 F.2d at 1351 (Gibson,J., dissenting). "[T]he court today leaves both the
question of entitlement and the determination of the proper method of protection to
the bankruptcy court. The weakness of the court's position is that it sets free the
bankruptcy court without guidance whatsoever on the entitlement issue." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
184. 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985).
185. Section 303 provides in pertinent part:
(b) An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with
the bankruptcy court of a petition
(1) by three or more entites, each of which is . . .a holder of a claim
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders . . .. by one or more of
such holders . ..
(c) After the filing of a petition under this section but before the case is
dismissed or relief is ordered, a creditor holding an unsecured claim . . .
may join in the petition with the same effect as if such joining creditor were a
petitioning creditor under subsection (b) of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
186. See Basin, 769 F.2d at 484.
187. Id. at 486-87. Bankruptcy Rule § 1003(d) provides that if the debtor answers
the involuntary petition by alleging the existence of 12 or more creditors, the court
shall afford an opportunity for other creditors to join the petition. The court's hold-
ing limits this rule to the extent that it requires an element of good faith on the part
of the filing creditor(s).
188. See id. at 486. The court recognized that if the petition is filed with a good
faith belief that the debtor had fewer than 12 creditors, the petition could be cured
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B. Frivolous Appeals
In the case of In re Nordbrock, 189 the Eighth Circuit awarded
attorney's fees to the debtor when the creditor appealed an ad-
verse ruling from the bankruptcy court, through the district
court and to the Eighth Circuit.' 90 The debtor asked the dis-
trict court to assess attorney's fees pursuant to section
303(i).1' The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision in favor of the debtor but denied assessing attorney's
fees.192
The creditor appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decisions in all respects.1 93 The debtor cross ap-
pealed, asking for attorney's fees either under section 303(i) or
under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 94
The court ruled that the lower court's denial of attorney's fees
under section 303(i) was not clearly erroneous and was there-
fore affirmed.19 5 The court, however, determined that the
creditor's appeal to the appellate court was frivolous and
therefore granted attorney's fees under Rule 38.196 The court
by allowing the others to join. See id.; see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
137, 303.08 (15th ed. 1985).
Other jurisdictions also recognize a good faith requirement to the filing provi-
sions. See, e.g., In re Crown Sportswear, 575 F.2d 991, 994 (1st Cir. 1978) (court
found no evidence of bad faith).
189. 772 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 400. In Nordbrock, the creditor filed an involuntary petition on the
grounds that the debtor was generally not paying his debts as they became due. Id. at
399.
191. Title 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) provides that the court may award costs and attor-
neys' fees under certain circumstances to the debtor if the petition is dismissed. It
provided that:
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on con-
sent of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the
right to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judgment-
(1) against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor for-
(A) costs;
(B) a reasonable attorney's fee; or
(C) any damages proximately caused by the taking of possession
of the debtor's property by a trustee ....
II U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982).
192. Nordbrock, 772 F.2d at 400.
193. The court, in its affirmance of the lower courts, held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys' fees under section 303(i). Id.
194. Rule 38 authorizes an award of attorneys fees as "just damages" for a frivo-
lous appeal. FED. R. App. P. 38.
195. Nordbrock, 772 F.2d at 400.
196. See Id. at 400. The court stated that:
Although Bankers Trust's appeal to the district court can be considered
nonfrivolous, its further appeal to this court cannot be justified in light of
[Vol. 12
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held that the creditor "should clearly have been on notice from
the existing case law that it stood little chance of prevailing
"197
This case presents difficult problems for the practitioner in
bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy court structure adds one level
to the appeals process not existing in other types of suits. The
court made reference to the creditor taking an unnecessary
"third bite" of the litigation apple. 98 This situation must be
considered by anyone who is challenging existing rules of law
in the bankruptcy area. Most suits brought in the federal court
system progress from the district to the circuit court. With the
addition of a third level for bankruptcy cases, the circuit courts
will be understandably less lenient with obviously weak ap-
peals. Practitioners should be forewarned that if, after defeat
in the bankruptcy and district court, the client wishes to ap-
peal, the risk of being assessed costs is greatly increased.
C. Chapter 11 Issues
Several recent cases have dealt with various aspects of Chap-
ter 11 reorganization petitions. In In re Clarkson, 199 the court
addressed the issue of feasibility of a plan for reorganiza-
tion.200 In Clarkson the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the notion
that "the feasibility test is firmly rooted in predictions based on
objective fact." 20 1 The court stated that "sincerity, honesty,
and willingness are not sufficient to make the plan feasible." 202
In applying the objective test, the court said that pertinent fac-
tors to consider in determining if the plan is feasible include
earning power, capital structure, economic conditions, mana-
gerial efficiency and whether current management would con-
the existing case law and the district court's thorough and well-reasoned
opinion considering and rejecting the principle authorities relied on by
Bankers Trust.
Id.
197. Id. at 400.
198. See Id.
199. 767 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985).
200. For statutory language regarding feasability, see II U.S.C. § 1129 (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984).
201. Id. at 420; see also Fossum v. Fed. Land Bank (In re Fossum), 764 F.2d 520,
522 (8th Cir. 1985) ("debtors must realize that reorganization is simply not possible
and Ithatl liquidation is the only feasible solution").
202. Clarksm, 767 F.2d at 420.
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tinue to operate the business while in reorganization.2 0 3 After
enunciating the standard, the court affirmed the dismissal of
the debtor's petition for reorganization based on the lack of
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation and the erosion of the
creditors' positions. 20 4
CONCLUSION
During the eighteen month period between July 1984 and
January 1, 1986, several significant developments occurred in
the area of bankruptcy law. The Eighth Circuit issued opinions
in such controversial topics as fraudulent conveyances, ade-
quate protection and apportionment between dischargeable
and nondischargeable debt. The court declined to follow the
national trend by holding that for a debt to be held nondis-
chargeable on grounds of intentional and malicious conver-
sion, it must be shown that the debtor acted with actual malice
and intent to cause harm. The court also addressed the issue
of lien avoidance by a former spouse on the former marital
homestead.
The area of bankruptcy is expanding rapidly, and conse-
quently, the law is changing with that expansion. The general
practitioner, as well as the bankruptcy expert, must keep
abreast of the area in order to fully advise clients on a wide
variety of matters.
Michael C. Krikava
203. Id.; see In re Great Northern Protective Services, Inc., 19 Bankr. 802, 803
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982).
204. Clarkson, 767 F.2d at 420. Similarly, in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Monnier (In re
Monner Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985), the court ofappeals noted that a lower
court determination on the issue of feasibility of a plan must be affirmed unless it can
be shown that the determination was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1341. The court noted
that "(i)n determining whether (a plan) is feasible, the bankruptcy court has an obli-
gation to scrutinize the plan carefully to determine whether it offers a reasonable
prospect of success and is workable." Id. (citing United Properties, Inc. v Emporium
Dep't Stores, Inc., 379 F.2d 55, 64 (8th Cir. 1967)). The court found that the bank-
ruptcy court had examined all of the relevant evidence of the case and determined
that the plan was feasible. Id. We have carefully reviewed the record, and cannot say
that the feasibility finding . . .was clearly erroneous." Id.
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